Constantinos Daskalakis: Mechanism Design via Optimal Transport
Tuesday, April 28, 2015 - 4:15pm to 5:15pm
Refreshments:
Light Refreshments
Location:
G575 *** Special Location***
Speaker:
Constantinos Daskalakis
Seminar group:
Abstract: I will present an optimization framework based on optimal transport theory, characterizing the structure of revenue-optimal mechanisms in single-bidder multi-item settings. Our framework provides closed-form descriptions of mechanisms, generalizes Myerson's celebrated single-item auction, and exhibits simple settings with very rich structure in their optimal mechanism. Our framework improves previous partial results, by establishing a strong duality theorem between optimal mechanism design and optimal transportation, and is enabled by an extension of the Monge-Kantorovich duality that accommodates convexity constraints.
The talk is based on work with Alan Deckelbaum and Christos Tzamos