Leakage Resilient Cryptography

The increasing popularity of cloud computing makes  side channel attacks a greater threat to cryptographic algorithms than previously realized. Whereas an attacker would have to be pretty motivated to install a device in your wall to measure your computer’s power consumption, it’s comparatively easy to load a bit of code on a server in the cloud and eavesdrop on other applications it’s running.

To address this reality, cryptographers have been investigating ways of protecting against broad families of side channels attacks for a broad spectrum of cryptographic algorithms and protocols, both at design time and through the introduction of general anti-side-channel-attack compilers. Researchers at the CIS group ahave taken a lead on these investigations. Below is a list of papers and articles on the groups research.



Chase, M., Putnam, A., Sherwood, T., Shumow, D., and Vaikuntanathan, V. "An Inspection-Resistant On-chip Memory Architecture." ISCA 2012. 

Akavia, A., Goldwasser, S., and Hazay, C. "Distributed Public Key Schemes Secure against Continual Leakage." ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing - PODC 2012.

Boyle, E., Goldwasser, S., Jain, A., Tauman Kalai, Y. "Multiparty Computation Secure Against Continual Memory Leakage." ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing - STOC 2012.  

Goldwasser, S., Rothblum, G. "How to Compute in the Presence of Leakage." FOCS 201231-40

Bellare, M., Cash, D., and Miller, R. "Cryptography Secure Against Related-Key Attacks and Tampering." AsiaCrypt 2011.

Boyle, E., Goldwasser, S., Tauman Kalai., Y.  "Leakage-Resilient Coin Tossing." The International Symposium on Distributed Computing - DISC 2011.

Boyle, E., Segev, G., Wichs, D.  "Fully Leakage-Resilient Signatures." Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT 2011. 

Brakerski, Z., Kalai, Y., Katz, J., and Vaikuntanathan, V. "Cryptography against continual Memory Leakage." FOCS 2010.  Cryptology Eprint Archive.

Brakerski, Z., Tauman Kalai, Y., Katz, J., and Vaikuntanathan, V.  "Overcoming the Hole in the Bucket: Public-Key Cryptography Resilient to Continual Memory Leakage." FOCS 2010. (Note: Brakerski was a PhD student of Goldwasser in Weizmann Institute)

Faust, S., Rabin, T., Reyzin, L., Tromer, E., and Vaikuntanathan, V. "Protecting against Computationally Bounded and Noisy Leakage." Eurocrypt 2010. [pdf]

Dodis, Y., Goldwasser, S., Kalai, Y., Peikert, C., and Vaikuntanathan, V. "Public-key Encryption Schemes with Auxiliary Inputs."  Theory of Cryptography Conference - TCC 2010. [pdf]

Goldwasser, S., Rothblum, G."Securing Computation against Continual Leakage." CRYPTO 2010.

Goldwasser, S., Kalai, Y., Peikert, C., and Vaikuntanathan, V. "Robustness of the Learning with Errors Assumption." Innovations in Computer Science - ICS 2010. [pdf]

Akavia, A., Goldwasser, S., and Vaikuntanathan V. "Cryptography against Memory Attacks." Theory of Cryptography Conference - TCC 2009. [pdf

 Katz, J., and Vaikuntanathan, V. "Signature Schemes with Bounded Leakage Resilience." Asiacrypt 2009. [pdf]

Canetti, R., Eiger, D., Goldwasser, S., Lim, D. "How to Protect Yourself without Perfect Shredding." ICALP 2008.



Goldwasser, S. "Thwart the Cleverest Side Channel Attackers." ConstituentWorks 2012.



Boyle, E., Garg, S., Jain, A., Tauman Kalai, Y., Sahai, A. "Secure Computation Against Adaptive Auxiliary Information." Manuscript.